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Abstract 
One year before my academic life began, Jim Kemeny published a book called 
‘Housing and Social Theory’ (Kemeny 1992).  This book has had a major impact 
within European housing and urban research over the last two and a half decades, 
not least by crystalizing its epistemic divisions into ‘mainstream’ and ‘critical’ (Webb 
2012).  In the face of Kemeny’s critique, ‘mainstream’ housing and urban 
researchers have remained wedded to ‘policy oriented’ empiricist approaches about 
which they have been defensive.  In fact, it could even be argued that policy oriented 
housing researchers have been emboldened during this period.  On the other hand, 
some housing and urban researchers have spent the last 25 years exploring the 
relationship between housing and social theory with a view to developing a more 
‘critical’ understanding of housing and housing policy.  My own work falls into this 
latter category and can be broken down into three phases (represented in the three 
parts of this thesis) which all bear the hallmarks of Kemeny’s influence, to greater or 
lesser degrees.  
 
Kemeny’s influence is most obvious in part I of the thesis.  This contains a series of 
papers that represent my attempts to develop a sociology of housing and housing 
research.  Although my initial contributions to the literature focussed on the social 
construction of housing problems and policy, my subsequent interventions recognise 
that it is not enough to focus ‘critical’ theoretical attention on policy issues alone; the 
context of research practice, itself, requires the same critical theoretical attention.   
This recognition set me on an intellectual track that resulted in published 
contributions to the sociology of knowledge literature, within the entrepreneurial 
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context of the contemporary university.  These contributions examine how 
entrepreneurial contexts shape academic subjectivities and the sociological 
episteme.  
 
If part I of the thesis finds sociology useful in illuminating housing policy and housing 
research practice then part II contains a book and two papers that call it into 
question.  The origins of this ‘hostile turn’ towards sociology are in two pieces of 
research (into the lives of heroin users and visual impaired children) where sociology 
had hindered my attempts to develop an adequate knowledge of the phenomena 
under the microscope.  The publications in this part of the thesis embrace 
phenomenology to make theoretical sense of the limits of the sociological episteme 
and to develop a more adequate understanding of the lives of heroin users and 
visual impaired children.  They also set me on an intellectual path that led to my 
theoretical development of a more fundamental critique of housing and urban 
research and, eventually, a constructive and reconciliatory resolution to what I have 
argued are its epistemic limitations.   
 
The book and two papers contained in part III of the thesis were produced in 
conditions of acute conflict.  The book and ‘fallacy paper’ were written in response to 
the controversial housing market renewal programme but were contextualised within 
my wider intellectual concerns about the fundamental problems of housing and 
urban research.  They represent a full-frontal intellectual ‘attack’ on the professional 
enterprise of housing and urban research and its social consequences.   The ‘impact’ 
paper was written and published 5 years later, following a ‘career break’ during 
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which I had reflected on the fundamentally conflictual nature of housing and urban 
research and sought nonviolent alternatives to such conflict.  It outlines a 
reconciliatory approach to housing and urban research that is true to the intellectual 
argument in the ‘fallacy paper’ whilst seeking to outline and advance the possibilities 
for collaboration between housing and urban researchers and their constituencies.   
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On Theory, Knowledge and Practice in Housing and Urban 
Research:  A Phenomenology of Conflict and Reconciliation  
 
A Critical Summary of the Submission  
 
Introduction 
My academic career, and contribution, has been mainly concerned with the issue of 
knowledge.  My objective has been to develop a critical understanding of the social 
conditions in which knowledge production takes place, the social distribution of the 
capacity for knowledge production, and the contexts in which knowledge produced is 
mobilised and applied.    
 
The PhD thesis is presented in three parts.  Part I of the thesis contains a series of 4 
publications that demonstrate my concern to develop a sociological knowledge of 
Housing Policy and Research.  To make sense of what I was trying to achieve at this 
point, it is necessary to locate one’s work within its social and biographical context.  
Thus part I of the critical summary begins by providing an introduction to the field of 
Housing Policy and Research as I found it.  It pays particular attention to the debate 
about the problematic ‘policy orientation’ of Housing Research that was occurring 
when I entered the field in the 1990s.  The papers in part I of the thesis are explicitly 
located within the context of this debate and are illustrative of my attempts to develop 
a sociological knowledge of Housing Policy and, latterly, Housing Research itself.   
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Part II of the critical summary contains a discussion of an autobiographical turn that 
led me to question the adequacy of such a sociology of Housing Policy and Research.  
This occurred during two research projects, in particular, in which I encountered 
problems with the sociological episteme.  Sociology was hindering my attempts to 
understand urban experience.  I subsequently embraced a phenomenological 
approach to housing and urban issues which I initially elaborated in publications that 
explored the urban experiences of visual impaired children and drug users and the 
experience of urban deprivation.  These publications seek to understand the epistemic 
limits of social science and develop a phenomenological approach to overcoming them 
in an urban context.  
 
If part II of the thesis has a phenomenological concern with the substantive aspects of 
housing and urban experience, part III works through the fundamentals of what a 
phenomenological commitment means for the enterprise of Housing Research writ 
large. It also elaborates an alternative way of ‘doing’ Housing Research per se.  It 
begins with the phenomenology of conflict perspective in my book Housing Market 
Renewal and Social Class (HMRSC) and the ‘fallacy paper’ which are hostile to 
sociology and Housing Research on philosophical grounds of adequacy and relevance.  
However, as I suggested above, autobiographical context is never far away from our 
intellectual work. My negative experiences of the conflicts and hostilities that 
surrounded HMRSC and the fallacy paper were partly responsible for my decision to 
take a career break in 2011.  Since returning to academe, I have been seeking to 
develop a reconciliatory approach to sociology and Housing Research within the 
context of my phenomenological commitments.   This is evident in the final paper to 
appear in the thesis which was published in 2016.  
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Part I:  For a Sociology of Housing Policy and Research 
Housing Policy Research in Brief Historical Context  
A key feature of the first part of my academic career was my attempt to grapple with 
the sociological problem of knowledge.  My initial engagement with these issues 
occurred after the publication of a landmark text ‘Housing and Social Theory’ by Jim 
Kemeny (1992) which made the argument that housing research had become 
disconnected from debates in the social sciences.  For Kemeny, the key problem with 
Housing Research was its regression towards the ‘policy orientation’ that marked its 
historical beginnings but which it had super ceded as it social scientifically matured in 
the 1960s and 1970s.   
 
Housing and Urban Research began in the early 20th century as an instrumental mode 
of empirical inquiry that serviced the needs of social reform, urban management and 
policy making (Savage and Warde 1993).  This was in keeping with the classic 19th 
century urban poverty studies of Charles Booth and others which marked the 
beginnings of housing research and defined its remit.  The key Housing Research task 
in this period was technocratic; to identify and solve housing problems in the public 
interest.  This instrumental orientation lasted until 1970s which saw a ‘theoretical turn’ 
in Housing Research.  This was prompted by the emergence of the ‘New Urban 
Sociology’ (NUS), which had its roots in Marxism and the urbanisation of Marxist 
thought (for instance Harloe 1977 1981).  The idea that cities had problems that could 
be objectively identified and solved by social scientists, or that they could be managed 
and reformed by technocrats, was anathema to NUS intellectuals.  They embraced a 
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theoretically grounded conflict perspective which saw the city as a site of capital 
accumulation, social reproduction and class conflict and began to write about it as 
such – leading to the development of a raft of influential Marxist urban theory (Castells 
1977; Harvey 1989; Lefebvre 1991).   
 
Although Kemeny (1982) had been critical of NUS, by the end of the 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s he was expressing concern that Housing Research was 
abandoning the theoretical roots that it had laid down in the 1970s (Kemeny 1988 
1992).  He and others, including myself, have since blamed this situation on the 
changing political economy of housing research (see Clapham 1997; Allen 2005; Allen 
and Marne 2010).  One of our key points has been this:  Whereas the NUS intellectuals 
occupied relatively autonomous positions within the 1970s university from which they 
could produce ‘critical’ scholarship, reductions in the government funding of 
universities throughout the 1980s, alongside an expansion of student numbers, 
eroded the time and space for producing scholarship.  This made later generations of 
Housing Researchers more reliant on ‘external’ funding in order to ‘buy’ themselves 
time to undertake research (Allen and Marne 2010). Moreover, it occurred at the very 
time that the Thatcher government was beginning to ‘contract out’ its research function 
to universities in order to shrink government departments (Clapham 1997; Hillyard et 
al 2004; Allen 2005; Allen and Marne 2010) whilst simultaneously placing more 
emphasis on ‘policy relevance’ in research supported by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (Hillyard and Sim 1997; Partington 1997; Allen and Marne 2010).  
Kemeny (1992) lamented these changes because they had led to an ‘epistemic drift’ 
of housing research into the language and concepts of the housing policy world and 
its disconnection from theoretical debates in the social sciences.  This was having 
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huge consequences:  Housing Researchers had begun to take-for-granted ‘official 
definitions’ of housing problems that circulated around the housing policy world they 
were now enmeshed in.   Kemeny (1992) argued that countering this problem of 
epistemic drift into the language and concepts of the housing policy world would 
require Housing Researchers to return to their social science disciplines.  
 
Initial Contributions to a Sociology of Housing Policy 
The early part of my academic career was spent in a Housing Research centre at 
Cardiff University.  From 1993, I was employed as a ‘Contract Researcher’ working on 
‘external’ funded projects in the area of housing and social policy.  The centre was 
enmeshed within Housing Policy networks and dominated by policy concerns.  
Although this suited my interests in the use of research as a tool of social improvement, 
I had broader interests in developing more ‘critical’ and ‘deeper’ theoretical 
understandings of society.  I was only able to purse this second ambition when David 
Clapham arrived as the new director of the research centre in 19941.  Jim Kemeny 
subsequently became a Visiting Professor at the centre.  
 
Although undertaking policy oriented research, the early part of my academic career 
was pursued under the mentoring of David Clapham and Jim Kemeny who were both 
advocates of a theoretical return to the social sciences. Moreover, they occupied 
institutional positions in Housing Research that were similar to those occupied by the 
                                                          
1 My first attempt to write theoretically was a neo-Marxist account of community care in Welsh 
Housing Quarterly (WHQ) prior to Clapham’s arrival.  The then Director of my research centre, who 
sat on the editorial board of WHQ, told me that nobody would be interested in such an article and 
encouraged me, instead, to produce a policy analysis.  
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originators of NUS in the 1970s:  In the same way that NUS intellectuals established 
their own institutions in order to re-shape the field of urban studies (e.g. Research 
Committee 21 within the International Sociological Association and an edited book 
series), Kemeny and Clapham wielded similar institutional influence in Housing 
Studies.  By the mid-1990s, Clapham was Chair of the Housing Studies Association 
as well as Director of the Centre for Housing Management and Development at Cardiff 
University.  He used these positions to inaugurate a number of events and 
conferences that addressed the interface of social theory with Housing Research.  He 
encouraged and facilitated my interest in theoretical work and also promoted it by 
providing me with key opportunities to speak at these events.  At the same time, 
Kemeny was appointed as editor of the international journal Scandinavian Housing 
and Planning Research and proceeded to re-orient and rename it, Housing, Theory 
and Society (HTS).   
 
Although Kemeny advocated for HTS to be a broad ranging journal that attracted work 
from across the social science disciplines 2  its early days were dominated by 
sociological contributions that reflected the work of its editor (Allen 2005b):  Since 
Kemeny (1984, 1992) had long emphasised the need for critical accounts of the social 
construction of ‘official’ definitions of housing problems, the social constructionist 
perspective dominated these early sociological theoretical contributions to HTS and 
other journals in the Housing Studies field (Franklin and Clapham 1997; Allen 1997; 
Allen 1999a, b; Saugeres 1999; Hunter and Nixon 1999; Gurney 1999a,b; Clapham et 
al 2000; Jacobs and Manzi 2000; Jacobs et al 2003).   This was not without 
                                                          
2 Sociology, psychology, political science, philosophy, economics etc. 
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consequence for the field of Housing Research.  Specifically, it had an unsettling 
epistemic effect on the dominant ‘policy oriented’ approach to Housing Research 
which had long claimed that it was involved in the task of using social scientific 
methodologies to investigate ‘real’ housing policy problems and produce ‘housing facts’ 
that would inform housing policy (Kemeny 1984).   Such a claim could no longer be 
‘taken for granted’ in a Housing Research community that now contained a growing 
number of researchers working on the social construction of ‘official definitions’ of 
housing ‘problems’ and policy.   
 
My earliest contributions to this emerging body of literature were social constructionist 
studies of the housing policy aspects of community care (Allen 1997; Allen 1999a,b).  
Refusing to work with official definitions of community care policy, these papers 
provide a constructionist theoretical account that locates the housing role in 
community care policy within wider frameworks of ideological and welfare professional 
meaning (Allen 1997). However, these papers did not simply serve as a warning of the 
dangers of working with official definitions.  They also opened up a discursive space 
in which new meanings could legitimately circulate and thereby influence thinking 
within the Housing Policy and Research community.  My comparative constructionist 
study of housing and community care in the UK and Sweden was key to this attempt 
to create and mobilise new meanings.  It enabled me to re-theorise the literature on 
‘welfare regimes’ using new conceptual classifications derived from the divergent 
ideological and professional meanings that were attached to the idea of community 
care in the UK and Sweden (Allen 1991a,b).   This provided a new framework of 
meaning through which the housing role in community care in the UK could be 
understood.   
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Initial Contributions to a Sociology of Housing Research  
Although the emergence and growth of social constructionist epistemology was 
unsettling for policy oriented Housing Research, it did not affect its overall health.  
Conversely, policy oriented Housing Research continued to flourish, especially during 
the New Labour period (1997-2010) when Housing Researchers embraced the Blairite 
idea of ‘evidence based policy’ (Cabinet Office, 1999) and took to their ‘fact producing’ 
and ‘policy influencing’ task with relish (for instance Bramley et al 2004).  Suffice it to 
say that, if these Housing Researchers were claiming that their activities were driven 
by an ontological commitment to the quest for ‘housing facts’, in the face of the social 
constructionist critique, then a consultation with the sociology of science literature 
would suggest otherwise.   Specifically, we learn that scientific fields are also social 
fields in which power relations regulate the context of knowledge production by, for 
instance, offering or withholding ‘credibility’, recognition and distinction to scientific 
work (Latour and Woolgar 1979; Bourdieu 2001).  This affects what is produced, how 
and with whom.  Since Housing Research is a social field, like all scientific fields, it 
follows that Housing Researchers’ knowledge production activities cannot be divorced 
from the ‘politics of recognition’ that governs activity in the field of Housing Research, 
which also happens to be embedded in a wider set of consecrating fields (e.g. 
government, business, university, sociology, geography, policy studies and so on).   
 
Although my earliest concerns were with the social construction of housing and social 
policy (Allen 1997, 1999a,b), I began to take an interest in the social construction of 
the activity of Housing Research in the late 1990s when I presented a paper on the 
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social production of housing and health research to a conference in Glasgow (Allen 
1997) which was later published in Housing, Theory and Society (Allen 2000).  My 
experience of presenting the paper, as well as the sociological analysis of Housing 
Research within it, brought what Latour and Woolgar (1979) call ‘laboratory life’ to the 
forefront of my attention.  One of Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) key points is that social 
scientists tend to invest their intellectual capital into laboratory life in a way that attracts 
credit and recognition.   Whilst concurring with this general point about credit and 
recognition, my own work in this area suggests that there is a need to introduce some 
nuances to it.  
 
For Latour and Woolgar (1979), pursuit of credit and recognition is generally the 
concern of individuals seeking to fashion and advance their social scientific career. 
Yet, my housing and health paper (Allen 2000) and some of my other work on 
knowledge production (Allen 2005) suggests that pursuit of credit and recognition can 
equally be the concern of social scientists merely seeking to create a space for 
themselves within academe.  In this sense, it points towards a pursuit of legitimacy in 
order to survive as much as it might point to the pursuit of self-advancement.  Moreover, 
and crucially, a Latour and Woolgarian reading of my housing and health paper (Allen 
2000) would additionally suggest that this need for legitimacy can be collective (i.e. 
the business of an entire research community) and not simply the concern of 
individuals.    
 
The core concern of my housing and health paper (Allen 2000) was to understand how 
the social and intellectual conditions in which housing and health research had 
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historically taken place had shaped the housing and health hypothesis (i.e. poor 
housing conditions cause illness) and thus Housing Researchers’ understandings of 
what they were doing.  A key argument in the paper is that a historical knowledge of 
the emergence of multi-disciplinary interests in ‘public health’ research in the 19th 
century is axiomatic to understanding the historical formation of the social scientific 
episteme and the claims that have subsequently been made in its name.  Specifically, 
social science has been historically wedded to a particular ‘over-socialised’ conception 
of the human body which is captured in the housing and health hypothesis, i.e. poor 
housing conditions cause illness.  This has led its practitioners to interpret ‘recalcitrant 
data’ (that raises questions about the veracity of the empirical relationship between 
poor housing conditions and illness) in ways that are favourable to its epistemic and 
hypothetical commitments.  So in place of attempting to produce a philosophical 
answer to the epistemological problems raised by recalcitrant data, Housing 
Researchers have instead invested their efforts in discursive work to protect the 
integrity of the housing and illness hypothesis and therefore the legitimacy of social 
scientific ‘interest’ in the field of housing and health research.  My paper tries to resolve 
these problems by producing a philosophical answer to the problem of ‘recalcitrant 
data’ and, in doing so (though perhaps naïvely when considered in the context of the 
sociology of science literature) concludes by arguing for a Housing Research that is 
more honest and humble about its own episteme.  This is a theme that I later returned 
to in the fallacy paper (Allen 2009) and impact paper (Allen 2016).   
 
If the housing and health paper (Allen 2000) was centrally concerned with the social 
production of knowledge within an inter-disciplinary context of ‘paradigm wars’ (Kuhn 
1962), my other concerns with Housing Research emerged from my own personal 
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experience of working as a contract researcher within entrepreneurial institutional 
contexts within the university.   I came to address these concerns on two levels; the 
institutional level and through the lens of academic labour and the academic career.   
I will address each of these in turn.  
 
First, during my time in the university, the individual pursuit of social scientific credit 
and recognition has occurred in what Gibbons et al (1994) have referred to as a ‘Mode 
II’ context of knowledge production.  This is a heteronomous context in which the 
sources of credit and recognition have expanded beyond the academy to include 
government departments and other agencies that are, in principle3, ‘external’ to the 
university and the social scientific field (see Bourdieu 1996).  In contrast to Latour and 
Woolgar’s (1979) classic sociological account of ‘the construction of scientific facts’ 
which emphasises the internal governance of a relatively autonomous scientific field, 
then, Gibbons et al (1994) draw our attention to the emergence of the business 
university (Allen and Imrie 2010) and academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 1997) 
where the individual search for social scientific credit and recognition takes place in a 
context that rewards the ability to secure ‘external funding’.  As I describe in an 
ethnographic account of entrepreneurial-university.co.uk (Allen and Marne 2010) in 
my book, The Knowledge Business (Allen and Imrie 2010), this has led to a situation 
in which the economic value of Housing Research has become paramount.  A key 
concern of my ethnographic account is to understand how this institutional economic 
prerogative has become an individual academic prerogative.  This becomes apparent 
in my discussion of the institutional organisation of entrepreneurial-university.co.uk.  
                                                          
3 It should be noted that representatives of government and business are increasingly found 
‘inside’ the university in the form of Visiting Professors and the like (Allen and Imrie 2010).  
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This describes how the entrepreneurial university has created ‘disciplinary’ and 
‘inspecting’ physical environments and bureaucratic mechanisms that seek to mould 
the subjectivities of its functionaries in ways that are consonant with its business ethos.   
Interestingly, the ethnographic case study reveals a university that shows signs of 
successfully producing entrepreneurial academic dispositions in harmony with its own 
institutional requirements.  So successful, in fact, that many of the entrepreneurial 
academics it has created show as much enthusiasm for the research business as the 
practice of research itself.  
 
This institutional ethnography is informative but, taken on its own, insufficient, because 
it fails to give an autobiographical insight into the entrepreneurial academic.  Thus the 
second level at which we must learn about the entrepreneurial context of knowledge 
production is that of the academic labourer.  My paper on the social relations of 
contract research production (Allen 2005) was directed to this task.  This paper draws 
our attention to the problem of reflexivity across the social sciences.  I suggest that, 
too often, academic reflexivity is exhibited within the context of individual research 
projects e.g. through diary keeping.  Yet our subjectivities as researchers are shaped 
over the course of a career rather than individual projects.  I acknowledge that this 
omission is partly addressed in discussions of positionality which address themselves 
to autobiography.  However, like Bourdieu (1977 2000), I am concerned that these 
discussions of positionality often address the societal (class, gender etc.) rather than 
institutional (university, business) contexts of academic autobiography and practice.  
Hence the paper provides an auto-ethnographic reflexive discussion of an academic 
career spent subject to the ‘disciplinary gaze’ of research funders.   I discuss how the 
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politics of recognition (or, rather, ‘satisfaction’4) in an entrepreneurial context has 
shaped my own attitudes towards, and practices of, knowledge production.  
Specifically, I show myself to be eagerly entrepreneurial but, in doing so, reveal 
another layer of complexity which shows that any characteristic enthusiasm for the 
business of research needs to be placed in its autobiographical context.  
 
That said, it is important to note that the politics of recognition is complex and not 
simply the result of naked self-interest and careerism (or even docility) even though it 
might be misunderstood as such.  For instance, Atkinson and Jacobs (2009) provide 
a summary of my auto-ethnographic account of a career subject to the ‘disciplinary 
gaze’ of research funders (Allen 2005) which concludes that:  
 
“Writing so candidly about his experiences in the research process in 
this way should be welcomed.  In particular, Allen’s account makes 
more explicit how research activity is also a political activity in that it 
is strategically used by academics as a way of securing promotion 
and collegial respect” (Atkinson and Jacobs 2009: 243) 
 
There is no doubt that Housing Research is ‘strategically used’ to secure respect and 
recognition.  This is why academic researchers make their intellectual investments 
where credit is available, and also why we can see a shift in the focus of intellectual 
investment activity over time – as currencies change.  So whereas Latour and 
Woolgar’s (1979) academics made investments in the relatively autonomous field of 
scientific production rather than outside of it, Gibbons et al (1994) and a host of other 
                                                          
4 My paper talks about producing research that ‘satisfied’ funders.  This then enabled me to secure 
future streams of funding.  Thus one element of a meta ‘politics of recognition’ – in an entrepreneurial 
context - is a ‘politics of satisfaction’.   
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writers have noted how contemporary social scientists now make investments in 
activities ‘external’ to the field of social scientific production where newly salient forms 
of credit and currency are to be found, e.g. enterprise activities such as ‘knowledge 
transfer partnerships’ (Allen and Marne 2010).  Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that investments in pursuit of recognition may be made for a variety of reasons beyond 
naked self-interest, and this is one of the things that the auto-ethnographic account of 
my research career (Allen 2005) was seeking to highlight in the context of power 
relations and positionality.  A key point in this paper is that the neoliberal university is 
a site of extreme job insecurity and that this is especially the case for ‘early career’ 
and working class academics trying to maintain a foothold in the academic labour 
market (Allen 2005).  It follows that intellectual and other investments in organisational 
life are often made for reasons of basic survival rather than, simply, credit or 
recognition in the service of self-advancement.  As I suggested earlier, then, they can 
be made to secure legitimacy in the field so that one’s craft may be practised - which 
may be for political rather than personal reasons5.  Suffice it to say that Gorz (1999) 
and Frayne (2015) would point out, and I would concur (Allen 2005; Allen and Marne 
2010), that the manufactured insecurity of academic labour only makes it easier for 
employing organisations such as universities to colonise the lifeworld of academic 
labourers and, in doing so, govern their subjectivities to the point of even shaping their 
intellectual outlook and values6.   
 
                                                          
5 My own reasons were highly political and relate to my class background and upbringing as well as 
passionate interest in inequality.   
6 This point might have greater application to the early stages of an academic career than its later 
stages.  For instance, my ‘contract career’ paper (Allen 2005) addressed my ‘early career’ phase in 
which entrepreneurial compliance was important to survival.  As I explain below, my later career has 
been very different.   
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Part II:  Epistemic Limits and Phenomenological New Beginnings – An 
Autobiographical Turning Point 
My initial concerns were to draw attention to, and generate understandings of, the new 
contexts in which knowledge is being produced within Housing and Urban Studies.  
The inescapable conclusion of the knowledge studies that I have included in part I of 
this thesis (Allen 2000 2005; Allen and Marne 2010) is that an epistemological 
scepticism of academic text is a requirement since texts can only be properly 
understood when located within the context of their production (Latour and Woolgar 
1979; Bourdieu 2000).   This consigns all work, including my own, into the category of 
contingency.   
 
As I approached the mid-2000s, I began to develop new understandings of the nature 
of this epistemic contingency. As a ‘critical’ social scientist, I had initially held the view 
that sociological knowledge was problematic but necessary.   Sociological theory is, 
after all, our route to critique.   This began to change when I was researching the 
housing and urban experiences of visual impaired children and the urban phenomenon 
of heroin use in the early and mid-2000s.  These two pieces of research threw up 
unique fieldwork challenges (which I explain more fully below) that led me to question 
the fundamentals of critical social science and taking a sociological theoretical point 
of view; Sociological theory was hindering my attempts to develop an adequate 
knowledge and understanding of the everyday urban experiences of the visual 
impaired children and heroin users.   I initially tried to make intellectual sense of these 
theoretical problems in a series of papers (Allen 2004a; Allen 2004b; Allen 2005c) and 
a book (Allen 2007) where I identified some limits of the sociological episteme and 
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developed a phenomenological perspective of the specific experiences of visual 
impaired children and drug users.  These papers appear in part II of the PhD thesis.  
They mark a phenomenological new beginning which set me on an intellectual track 
that culminated in my ‘fallacy paper’ (Allen 2009) and Housing Market Renewal and 
Social Class book (Allen 2008) which form key publications in part III of this PhD.    
 
Towards a Phenomenology of Urban Experience: Disability and Drug Use   
Bourdieu (2000) argues that an objectifying and reflexive attitude to the social world is 
an epistemological requirement of social science and axiomatic to its ambition to 
construct a form of theoretical reasoning that takes us beyond ‘common sense’ 
reasoning (see also Berger and Luckmann 1966; Francis and Hester, 2004).  However, 
strengths can also be weaknesses; theoretical reasoning can equally hinder our 
understanding of the social world.  This hindrance was the intellectual problematic that 
led to my papers on visual impaired children and drug users which were concerned 
with the lack of access that social science theory and methodology gave me to their 
experiences, and which led one respondent to say “I don’t know what you’re trying to 
establish” (Allen and Milner 2004).   Specifically, the theoretically reasoned research 
questions that I was asking in the field during both of these research studies were 
failing to elicit ‘satisfactory answers’ or, indeed, any answers at all.  On hearing my 
questions, then, drug users were unable to provide contextualised accounts of their 
drug use that contained ‘reasoned reasons’, i.e. answers to ‘why’ questions (Allen 
2005c, 2007).  They ‘just did it’.  The children in my visual impairment study had similar 
difficulties in providing me with a ‘reasoned’ account of the social nature of their 
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problems with housing and the built environment.  It was just ‘there’ – a feature of an 
everyday life that simply ‘happened’ (Allen 2004a).  
 
My task now was to understand why social science theory and methodology had been 
so inadequate in my attempts to understand experience.  Some of the classic critiques 
of sociological theory and method have been provided by Garfinkel (1967) in ‘Studies 
in Ethnomethodology’ and Schutz (1972) in ‘The Phenomenology of the Social World’.  
Although ethnomethodology provides a useful critique of social science theory and 
method, its emphasis on the methods that people use to create and maintain local 
order (e.g. uncovered through ‘breaching experiments’) was less useful to my concern 
with how the social world is experienced and felt.   I began to engage with 
phenomenology because it emphasised the limits of social science that I was 
concerned with and the requirement to understand the ‘primary experience’ of the 
world, i.e. as it is encountered by participants prior to the arrival of social scientists ‘on 
the scene’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962).   
 
My phenomenological turn initially took two forms.  First, following Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1962) discussion of the body-in-space, I began to grapple with the idea that 
knowledge of housing and the urban environment was corporeal rather than merely 
intellectual and reasoned, i.e. the result of a body that inhabits and knows space 
through its intentional everyday activities without needing to intellectually comprehend 
it.  That is to say, it is a body that appropriates space ‘in the hands’ and ‘in the legs’ 
through time-space routines which sediment into a corporeal schema that exists 
beyond everyday consciousness (Allen 2004a).  On undertaking a phenomenological 
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re-examination of the ‘data’ that I had collected from visual impaired children, then, I 
began to understand that it pointed to the existence of corporeal schemas that left 
visual impaired children unable to account for their experiences of housing and the 
built environment with the ‘reasoned reasons’ that I was originally asking for (Allen 
2004a; see Seamon 1979 for a similar problem of accountability in ‘able bodied’ 
people).  Their knowledge of housing and the urban environment was simply sediment 
in their phenomenal body which, accordingly, was frequently unable to account to me 
for its actions and inactions.  This led me to raise a series of questions about the 
sociological problematisation of experiences of disability and impairment (Allen 
2004a,b).  
 
The second form that my phenomenology took was concerned with the use of 
language and, in particular, social scientific language.  In my Housing, Theory and 
Society paper on the phenomenology of urban deprivation (Allen 2005c) and my book 
Crime, Drugs and Social Theory: A Phenomenological Approach (Allen 2007), I was 
particularly concerned with the social scientific approach to accounting for urban 
behaviours such as drug use which I suggested was based on asking ‘why’ questions 
and eliciting ‘reasoned reasons’.  Moreover, I was concerned with the way in which 
social scientific language, which is produced at a social and epistemic distance from 
urban phenomena as they occur, provides limited access to, and understanding of, 
urban phenomena.  A key purpose of these two publications, therefore, concerned the 
assigning of articulatory authority to the experiencing subject.  First, I suggested that 
this should entail a relinquishing of the social scientific demand for ‘satisfactory 
answers’ from respondents, which is an explicit, if not implicit, requirement in the social 
scientific quest for ‘reasoned reasons’ (Bourdieu 2000).  Thus I began to understand 
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drug users answers to ‘why’ questions about their drug, such as ‘I just do it’, as the 
utterances of an unselfconscious habitus that was offering access to the primacy of its 
lived experience.  I no longer considered them to be prompts for ‘probing’ questions 
(such as ‘when you day “I just do it” what do you mean by that?’), which are the stock-
in-trade response of a ‘normal’ social science which forgets that: 
 
“The practical privilege in which all scientific activity arises never more 
subtly governs that activity (insofar as science presupposes not only an 
epistemological break but also a social separation) than when, 
unrecognised as privilege, it leads to an implicit theory of practice which 
is the corollary of neglect of the social conditions in which science is 
possible” (Bourdieu 1977: 1)  
 
Second, it also entails allowing everyday speech forms that emanate from the density 
of lived experience to ‘speak for themselves’ in social scientific text rather than through 
the ‘sugar coating’ of a social scientific language that, as Gadamer (1975) suggests, 
hermeneutically ‘flattens’ and disfigures experience.   This prompted me to pay 
attention to the way in which my own use of social scientific concepts and language, 
explicitly in text and implicitly fieldwork situations, constituted ‘linguistic violence’ 
because they hoovered up the ‘primary meanings’ that respondents gave to me and 
then re-presented them in a social scientific language that violated those meanings.  
An example of this occurring was when I probed respondents to account for their drug 
use (‘when you say ‘just happens’ what do you mean by that?’) rather than allow myself 
to encounter and accept their descriptions of drug use ‘in the thick of it’ where it ‘just 
happened’, i.e. in a language that gave access to the primacy of experience.  
Respecting the social scientific ‘authority’ of the interviewer, respondents tended to 
acquiesce to these probing invitations to provide new meanings to their practices (‘I 
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suppose I was really doing this or that’) even though they constituted a violation of the 
primary meanings that they had already given to me of things ‘happening’.  The point 
now was to avoid such ‘misunderstandings’.   
 
Part III:  From a Phenomenology of Conflict to Reconciliation  
A key characteristic of my work on visual impaired children and drug users was the 
epistemic conflict that lay at the heart of the relationship between social scientists and 
their respondents.  A key aim here was to question the veracity of social scientific 
understandings of the social world and, in doing so, open up a discursive space in 
which alternative understandings could articulate themselves.  This continued in my 
book Housing Market Renewal and Social Class (Allen 2008).  The social scientific 
context for the book is three-fold.  First, it was set in the context of a research 
community that had become deeply divided over the policy of Housing Market 
Renewal.  Second, it makes a phenomenological argument that ‘class matters’ and 
how this is the case.  Third, it articulates phenomenological perspective on working 
class experiences of urban regeneration.  
 
Housing Market Renewal and Social Class:  A Study OF and IN Conflict 
Taking the issue of research context first.  My Housing Market Renewal and Social 
Class book (Allen 2008) was published during the New Labour era when ‘evidence 
based policy’ was in vogue.  During this period, there was an abundance of 
government funding for Housing Research and Housing Researchers were generally 
embracing it.  This was especially the case with the government’s ‘Housing Market 
Renewal Programme’ (HMRP) which was marketed as an evidence based programme 
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par excellence (Cole and Nevin 2004; Leather et al 2007).  Moreover, HMRP took the 
idea of ‘evidence based’ policy to new levels (Webb 2010 2012).   Housing 
Researchers were now not only providing ‘independent evidence’ to inform 
government policy.  HMRP had also been devised by Housing Researchers, and was 
now even being evaluated by the very same Housing Researchers (see Cole and 
Nevin 2004; Leather et al 2007).  This was not merely a temporal transgression of 
Weber’s sacred line between science and politics (Weber 1946).  It was tantamount 
to setting up camp on the other side of the fence.   
 
During the period in which HMRP was being ‘rolled out’, I had undertaken research 
into the existential relationship between people and housing in HMRP areas of 
Liverpool and Salford.  I was analysing the data from this research when Lee Crookes, 
a PhD student from the University of Sheffield, approached me – then a University 
Professor - about giving evidence to a public inquiry that was taking place into the 
issue of Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPOs) on working class people living in HMRP 
areas of Liverpool that I had studied.  Having been analysing my data on working class 
experiences of housing in these areas I was sceptical of HMRP, but had not made any 
commitment to become involved in the public inquiries.  However, I was horrified to 
hear what Lee told me about the working class experience of the public inquiry7 and 
so indicated that I would give evidence at the public inquiry in support of a community 
that was facing the prospect of losing home.  As I threw myself into the now urgent 
task of completing my analysis of the effects that HMRP was having on working class 
                                                          
7 Lee Crookes’ claims were verified by my own subsequent involvement with, and observations of, 
public inquiries in Liverpool and Oldham.  
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people I realised that my evidence would need to be in outright opposition to the CPO 
for reasons that I gave in the book that followed.   
 
‘News’ quickly circulated throughout the Housing Research field about the 
‘confrontation’ that had taken place at public inquiry between myself and the Housing 
Researchers that were advocating for HMRP and CPO8.  My Housing Market Renewal 
and Social Class book, which was then forthcoming, subsequently became a topic of 
much discussion, disagreement and even controversy9 within the Housing Research 
and Policy community.  This shaped its conditions of reception.  Moreover, there was 
already an intellectual 10  and institutionalised 11  divide between ‘critical’ and 
‘mainstream’ Housing Research (Hamnett 2010, Webb 2012) which had led to intense 
disagreements and controversy within the research community over the 
heteronomous involvement of Housing Researchers in HMRP12.  This meant that most 
responses to my hostile book fell on one or other side of the mainstream / critical 
dichotomy13.   
 
                                                          
8 Newspapers even wrote stories about my confrontations with these Housing Policy Researchers 
(Qureshi 2009; Corbyn 2009). 
9 My publisher, Routledge, was threatened with legal action by one of the architects of HMRP and a 
HMRP partnership in advance of publication.  From the letters received, the intention behind the legal 
threat seemed to be to acquire an advance copy of the book in order to influence its contents before 
publication.  (A similar intervention was later made in relation to a PhD thesis).  This was refused and, 
in the event of publication, the action did not materialize.  Throughout this period, however, I received 
threatening emails warning me to “behave”.       
10 For instance, between ‘theory’ and ‘policy’ oriented research. 
11 For instance, in journals, conferences and academic networks. 
12 For instance, Housing Researchers occupied government positions and government consultants 
were appointed to visiting professorships (Allen and Imrie 2010). 
13 An exception to this is Flint (2010) who produced a critical appreciation of my arguments about 
HMRP. 
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Housing Researchers that had been closely involved in devising and implementing 
HMRP produced dismissive accounts of my position that did not entirely conform to 
the conventions of normal academic discourse (Sprigings 2010; Cole 2008).   My 
‘name’ was damaged by these interventions and I became marginalised within 
Housing Policy research networks where even long standing friends began to dis-
identify with me.  On the other hand, my reputation and credit-rating simultaneously 
grew in the ‘critical’ Housing Research community where I became something of a 
cause celebre.  I received numerous invites to speak and write in ‘critical’ spaces that 
may never have materialised without the interest that my book had attracted. Moreover, 
on publication Housing Market Renewal and Social Class was well-received by critical 
urbanists and has since been named in a Top 10 of Urban Studies Books in the journal 
Urban Geography.  Although I was marginalised in the Housing Policy Research 
community, then, I was suddenly in email contact with Loic Wacquant and Neil Smith.    
 
Moving onto the content of the book and, in particular, the issue of class.  The book 
was written during a time when working class studies were losing currency in sociology 
(Skeggs 2004; Charlesworth 2000) and Housing Research (Allen 2010b).  Sociology 
was becoming dominated by concerns with self-identity, reflexivity and consumption 
whereas Housing Research was preoccupied with new patterns of housing 
consumption.  To some extent, this reflected the intellectual influence that Anthony 
Giddens had exerted over sociology from the mid-1980s but also the effects of the 
New Labour consumer boom in the housing market.  This context is key to 
understanding the argument in Housing Market Renewal and Social Class.  
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A core argument in the book emerged from my ongoing auto-ethnographic (Allen 2005) 
and ethnographic (Allen 2008b; Allen and Marne 2010) studies of Housing Policy 
Research which were facilitated by my then institutional proximity to it.  This enabled 
me to emphasise how the social and scientific positionality and habitus of Housing 
Researchers was governing their ‘interest’ in the market for houses in highly specific 
ways:   As social scientists that had a social and epistemic proximity to the ‘housing 
market’ but were socially and spatially separate from HMRP neighbourhoods, Housing 
Researchers took a panoramic ‘interest’ in the market for houses within and between 
urban neighbourhoods (which they only knew from the epistemic distance of the 
panoramic ‘scientific gaze’) as a space of positions and position taking, e.g. they were 
interested in ‘market behaviour’, ‘market change’, ‘neighbourhood change’, ‘housing 
aspirations’ and so on (Allen 2010b).   
 
In this relational schema, urban neighbourhoods were subjected to quantitative and 
qualitative comparison and then judged with reference to what the panoramic and 
normalising scientific gaze revealed as ‘normal’ in economically ‘successful’ 
neighbourhoods.  Economically ‘failing’ neighbourhoods were thereby condemned for 
‘lacking’ in features that made the housing market in a ‘normal’ neighbourhood 
‘functional’.  Specifically, they were considered to be ‘lacking’ in housing types that 
would attract middle class and ‘aspirational’ households.  Hence they required 
‘housing market renewal’.  Suffice it to say that this way of thinking about the market 
for houses was so inscribed into the epistemic mentalities of HMRP researchers, 
which was revealed in their language and discourse, that I described it as a specific 
form of market ‘doxa’ (Allen 2008, Allen 2008b, Allen 2010b).  My key problem with it 
was this:  Given that this doxa was cultivated ‘outside’ of working class experience, it 
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was precluding a class perspective of the market for houses that was germane to 
everyday life within working class neighbourhoods.  
 
If Housing Research was failing to offer a working class perspective of 
neighbourhoods then, following Skeggs (1997 2004), I argued that sociology was 
faring no better.  In her book Class, Self, Culture, Skeggs (2004) made a 
phenomenological argument that class intellectually mattered less to sociology 
because it personally mattered less to sociologists.  In her argument, which contained 
shades of standpoint epistemology (see Harding 1991) and existential 
phenomenology (Schutz 1972), Skeggs not only emphasised the inseparability of 
social science from experience but also the idea that the former is parasitic on the later 
(Gadamer 1975).  Following Bourdieu (1977 2000) she argued that most sociologists 
embodied a middle class habitus; a scheme of perception that not only emerged from 
and normalised their own relation to economy, culture and consumption but also reified 
them.  In this scenario, the world as it appeared to sociologists in experience was 
tacitly being mistaken for the world as it was for others.   This world was all about self-
identity and consumption as, indeed, a consultation with the sociological literature 
would verify.   
 
I proceeded to argue that this sociological preoccupation with ‘lifestyle politics’ 
(Giddens 1990) was having consequences for the way in which working class people 
were appearing in sociological and urban literatures.  Whereas the classic sociological 
accounts of working class life and culture had emphasised what it was (Wilmot and 
Young 1962; Willis 1977; Williams 1957) working class people now began to appear 
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in the sociological literature as ‘failed consumers’ and objects of disgust (e.g. Tyler 
2008), i.e. in terms of what they were lacking and thus what they were not.   This also 
applied to the urban gentrification literature which had become preoccupied with the 
urban lifestyles of a middle class that it celebrated (Slater 2006).  Working class people 
now began to appear in this literature as beneficiaries of the middle class gentrification 
of neighbourhoods that had previously been ‘lacking’ (see Freeman 2011) or, in the 
more ‘critical’ literature, as victims of displacement (Slater 2006).  Either way, working 
class people were not appearing as human agents in the housing market in their own 
right, that is, as people that were actively involved in creating their own forms of 
housing consumption outside of the dominant market emphasis on the space of 
positions and position taking.   Put simply, working class experience and culture was 
ceasing to exist in its own right (Charlesworth 2000).    
 
I returned to my phenomenology to overcome these problems and thereby seek to 
recapture working class experience.  My key point was that the urban experience of 
working class people could not simply be understood in relation to a social scientifically 
normalised view of housing markets or urban lifestyle – however benevolent the intent 
of such an enterprise may be.  Beyond the relational politics of social positioning, to 
‘be’ working class was primarily an existential matter and needed to be addressed as 
such, i.e. as a specific form of being-in-the-world that was able to speak-for-itself as 
well as relationally.  Now although a defining characteristic of urban working class 
existence is proximity to economic necessity, this does not mean that working class 
people define or mark themselves out in terms of what they ‘lack’ in resources and 
thus do not have.  Conversely, the understanding that I reached as a result of my own 
phenomenological research was that a life lived at proximity to necessity shaped 
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working class subjectivities in specific ways; resulting in a form of being that actively 
grasped and shaped the world around it in ways that were specific to the urgent 
necessities that governed its existence and conditioned its being.   
 
This drove to the heart of a key argument about class in my book, which was this: It is 
important to ‘get inside’ the ‘being’ of working class people in order to understand their 
primary experience of housing, home, neighbourhood and so on, i.e. before and 
outside of theirs or any attempts to relate their housing practices to those of middle 
class people or, indeed, social scientific schemas.  In attempting to be faithful to 
working class ‘being’ as it presented itself to me, the book therefore developed the 
idea of a ‘practical economy’ of working class housing consumption in which people 
primordially relate to the social world through the necessities that govern their own 
practical existence rather than in relation to other idealised lives and lifestyles.  
Housing, home and neighbourhood were ‘dwelling space’, that is, ‘spaces of being’ 
rather than spaces of lack, deficiency, absence or even accumulation.    
  
This brings me to the third issue, which is regeneration.  Policy makers usually 
represent urban regeneration as a ‘win-win’ scenario that is in the ‘public interest’ 
(Slater 2006; Allen and Marne 2010b).  This was certainly the case with the urban 
regeneration programme under consideration in the book.  The Housing Market 
Renewal Programme (HMRP) emerged out of a series of academic studies of ‘low 
demand’ for housing in urban areas throughout the Midlands and North of England 
(see especially Nevin et al 1999).  The authors of these studies argued that housing 
markets were ‘failing’ in some urban areas because the demand for housing was low 
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and falling.  This was deemed to be problematic for a range of reasons; two of which 
will be mentioned here.  First, low demand for housing was associated with 
disinvestment in the housing stock and therefore neighbourhood decline.  Second, low 
demand was associated with low prices and therefore growing inequalities between 
those living in these areas and people living in areas where prices were rising.  This 
second problematic was deemed to be especially salient in a context where housing 
wealth was growing as a proportion of overall household wealth (Forest and Murie 
1995).   HMRP addressed itself directly to these problems and, in doing so, aimed to 
‘fix’ housing markets that were ‘failing’.  Key instruments that were used in this respect 
were demolitions of ‘outdated’ and ‘unwanted’ housing (which required the issuing of 
CPOs on people that refused to leave their homes) and the erection by volume builders 
of ‘high value’ homes that were said to be more suitable for ‘modern and contemporary 
living’.  Perhaps strangely, in the context of a housing affordability crisis, the ultimate 
objective was to increase house prices.   
 
In some ways, the stated aims of HMRP were laudable.  Who could object to a 
programme that promised to tackle growing wealth inequalities?  However, the 
phenomenological class perspective in my book threw a different light on it.  I argued 
that HMRP was not a technocratic ‘fix’ for ‘failing’ housing markets that was in the 
‘public interest’, as its adherents claimed.  HMRP was political.   Specifically, it was 
the product of a market doxa that constituted and naturalised the market for houses 
as a ‘space of positions’ and ‘position taking’ in which neighbourhoods were 
comparatively understood according to key features such as price levels, housing 
infrastructure and reputation.  Within this schema, HMRP areas were seen as ‘lacking’ 
(in attractive house types) and ‘failing’ (in price competitiveness).  Put sociologically, 
35 
 
then, the problem that HMRP was seeking to address was the ‘lack’, ‘failure’ and 
resultant disconnection of some neighbourhoods from the space of positions because 
it was inhibiting position taking.   
 
Far from accepting the policy view that HMRP was in the ‘public interest’ and in the 
interest of working class people living in ‘failing’ neighbourhoods, the phenomenology 
of working class housing practices presented in my book raised a wide range of 
serious questions about HMRP.  I will mention two at this point.  First, my 
phenomenology of working class experiences of ‘failing’ neighbourhoods suggested 
that the objective indicators of decline produced by social scientists (e.g. low prices, 
higher than normal vacancy rates) were irrelevant in the context of the practical 
economy that governed working class relationships to housing, home and 
neighbourhood.  Most people went about their everyday lives in these neighbourhoods, 
and described doing so, in largely unproblematic ways.  As such, they were often 
bemused by objective descriptions of their ‘failing’ neighbourhoods and would point 
out that they had been erroneously produced at a social scientific distance from the 
‘reality’ of their neighbourhood lives.  In other words, they located ‘failure’ in the 
descriptions of their neighbourhoods rather than the neighbourhoods themselves.   
 
Suffice it to say that working class residents were not merely concerned to contest 
social scientific descriptions of their neighbourhoods.  Perhaps more importantly, they 
also had something to say about what made their houses, homes and neighbourhood 
valuable to them and how they had created this value in their own practices.  This was 
contained in their constant references to the ‘lived value’ of their homes and 
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neighbourhoods, which spoke of a practical economy of housing consumption that 
valorised dwelling as a space of being and a space for the realisation of being.  These 
were not people that were overly concerned with their house prices or objective 
indicators of decline, then.  Moreover, they had no interest in the rhetorical HMRP idea 
of building ‘high value’ or ‘modern and contemporary’ homes which, in fact, bemused 
them.  They were people that were busily engaged in the urgent task of attending to 
the necessities of everyday life whilst also being knitted into the fabric of each other’s 
lives in the ‘lived spaces’ and spaces of being of their homes and neighbourhoods.  
For all of these reasons, the proposed housing demolition programme made no sense.   
 
Knowledge of this did not deter the advocates of HMRP who saw regeneration in 
narrow technocratic terms.  This became particularly apparent in the debate that took 
place about the affordability of the new ‘modern and contemporary’ houses that would 
take the place of the demolished homes.  Under questioning at one of the Liverpool 
Public Inquiries, a volume builder stated that the average selling price of the new 
houses would be £125,000. He argued that this was “affordable‟ because a couple 
earning £22,000 each (which was the average income in the city at the time) could, at 
a multiple of 3.5, purchase a house for £154,000. Yet 57% of households in my case 
study areas had a household income of less than £10,000 per annum and a further 
16% of less than £15,000 per annum.  In other words, the price of houses in the new 
dwelling scape was going to be far beyond what people already living there could 
afford.  Yet, this technical issue of the affordability of the new homes was not the point.  
Working class people generally did not want to be stretched to the outer limits of 
affordability, even if the new houses were technically affordable to them which, as the 
above calculations indicate, they were not. From the phenomenological point of view 
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outlined in my book, the more fundamental issue concerned the violation of working 
class ways of being toward housing by HMRP.  This violation was happening because 
HMRP was seeking to eliminate ‘low value’ housing stock from urban areas in order 
to reconnect ‘failing’ neighbourhoods to the space of positions.  In doing so, HMRP 
was forcing working class people to participate in the space of positions and, as such, 
to view their homes, houses and neighbourhoods as positioned within the space of 
positions; not least because of the level of financial investment that was now required 
to buy a house.  As such, it was eradicating the possibility for working class households 
to make their choice to prioritise dwelling over consuming and, with it, the practical 
economy of housing consumption.  That is, it was wiping a whole way of ‘being-in-the-
city’ off the urban map.  
 
Ways Forward: From a Phenomenology of Conflict to Reconciliation  
Having been through the experience of publishing Housing Market Renewal and 
Social Class, which included attendance at Public Inquiries where social science 
played such a key role in silencing residents voices, I now felt compelled to produce a 
fundamental philosophical critique of Housing Studies.   The ‘fallacy paper’ (Allen 2009) 
was published in 2009 and was written amidst the debates that were occurring about 
HMRP and my book. The paper constitutes a philosophical attack on the legitimacy of 
Housing Research and uses HMRP as key case study material.  As the paper explains, 
I deemed this necessary because Housing Researchers had used their status and 
work as social scientists to claim – in the forum of public inquiries and elsewhere - that 
they had produced a superior knowledge of neighbourhoods to that held by people 
that lived in them.  In fact, this is what ultimately justified the planning inspectors’ 
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decision to issue CPOs in Liverpool (Grainger 2006).   Yet, as the phenomenological 
narrative in Housing Market Renewal and Social Class suggested, such claims to 
superior insight are contingent and certainly held little weight inside the 
neighbourhoods themselves.   
 
Suffice it to say that the point of the paper was not to go over old ground.  It was to lay 
down a philosophical challenge to Housing Research in the hope that researchers 
would be forced to confront the basis of their own a priori claims to knowledge and 
knowing.  Hence, I extended the argument well beyond HMRP in order to emphasise 
its general applicability.  As such, the paper provides a comprehensive philosophical 
critique of the social scientific idea of “Housing Studies” drawing on the 
phenomenological insights of a range of scholars, most notably Hans Georg Gadamer, 
Martin Heidegger, Michael Lynch, Maurice Merlea-Ponty, Alfred Schutz and Peter 
Winch.  Their insights enabled me to raise fundamental issues about the social 
scientific nature of Housing Research, which I call into question on the 
phenomenological grounds that a Comte-like ‘scientific’ master view is beyond the 
capabilities of Housing Researchers who can only, after all, relate ‘being-ly’ to housing 
(Heidegger 1988).  The implication of this is that the development of a scientific master 
view (of, say, housing markets or neighbourhoods) cannot be task of Housing 
Research.  The research task, rather, can only really be to understand how our being 
(as social scientists or residents of a neighbourhood) makes housing intelligible to us.   
 
The unavoidable conclusion of this philosophical argument was the need to dispense 
with the elitist idea of intellectualism and to work instead with the Gadamerian and 
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much more democratic idea of intelligibility which “implies the end of ‘Housing Studies’, 
at least insofar as it has a philosophical justification for constituting itself as such” 
(Allen 2009: 72).  This allowed me to propose a Gadamerian conception of ‘housing 
studies’ in which Housing Researchers were “well within their rights to continue to do 
what they do and to make their own arguments about housing, [but] they cannot 
constitute what they do and what they know as superior to ‘what everybody knows’” 
(Allen 2009: 74)14.  They now needed to “afford equal recognition to the knowledge 
claims made by others” (Allen 2009: 74).   As such, the Fallacy paper opened up 
intellectual space so that ‘ordinary’ and ‘everyday’ understandings of housing could 
legitimately impose themselves.  Had this occurred during the process of implementing 
HMRP, it might have saved a lot of pain and suffering.  
 
My “getting out there and impacting paper” (Allen 2016) was published after I had 
taken a ‘career break’.  The paper emerged from a great deal of reflection on the 
conflict that characterised social scientific debates about HMRP and, as such, 
represents an attempt to develop, out of my phenomenology, a reconciliatory and 
collaborative approach to housing research and urban change.  The paper begins with 
a point of self-critique: Although the debate about HMRP was rancorous on all sides 
(Webb 2010) and resulted in my receiving threatening emails (Allen, 2010), the paper 
openly acknowledges my own role in these conflicts.  My specific contention is that my 
‘fallacy paper’ pitted social science knowledge against everyday forms of knowing and, 
in doing so, reproduced the epistemic conflict between them rather than sought a 
                                                          
14 At this point it is relevant to note that my use of capital letters to refer to Housing Research is a 
reference to its institutional form and the epistemic superiority on which it is based.  My reference to 
housing studies is indicative of the more democratic research system that I would like to see that 
contained no such hierarchy.  
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resolution.  Moreover, as Webb (2012) suggests, my ‘fallacy paper’ was “forceful” in 
emphasising the conflictual basis of these different forms of knowing.  He is correct:  
The fallacy paper was written in a context in which residents’ everyday knowledge of 
housing and neighbourhoods was being patronised by Housing Researchers, so it 
sought to ‘turn the tables’ by ‘attacking’ the foundations of the social scientific episteme.   
 
Having made this admission, I set out to achieve some sort of reconciliation in the 
main body of the paper.   I seek to achieve this reconciliation within the context of the 
REF ‘impact’ schema, which seeks to assure the relevance of sociological knowledge 
to society.  My starting point is to acknowledge the fractious division of Housing 
Research into ‘mainstream’ and ‘critical’ approaches (Webb 2012) which, as I 
indicated above, can shape the conditions of knowledge reception in unhelpful ways.  
I suggest that the answer to the problem of knowledge relevance is neither to be 
‘critical’ or ‘mainstream’ - not least since the adoption of such stances can create and 
perpetuate unnecessary conflict.  Looking at things phenomenologically, I suggest that 
there are deeper commonalities between critical and mainstream Housing Research 
which make them both problematic.  A key commonality between them is the idea that 
there is an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of social science.  Both critical and mainstream 
Housing Researchers position themselves on the ‘inside’ seeking to impact the social 
world ‘outside’ using the theoretical and methodological instruments of their social 
science.  In this schema, the publication of social scientific text is idealised as a 
“moment of rupture” that provides the catalyst for housing and urban change ‘out there’.  
As such, they both maintain a dualism between social science and everyday 
knowledge, regardless of how ‘critical’ or anthropologically ‘out there’ they are.    
41 
 
 
Now any attempt to overcome the dualism between social science and everyday forms 
of knowing requires an intellectual attitude of humility which, in turn, implies 
acceptance of the phenomenological critique of social science.   This requires us to 
move beyond social sciences such as Housing Research in order to embrace the 
phenomenological idea of a ‘housing studies’.  In fact, it is a prerequisite.  However, 
we already know much about this (Allen 2009).  The problem now is that it is one thing 
to scale back social scientific knowledge claims but quite another to know how to 
engage with the knowledge claims of others.  Thus we require guidance on how to 
construct a more reconciliatory and collaborative social science.  To begin this process, 
the paper turns to anarchist social thought.   In doing so, it seeks to reconfigure the 
objective of housing research away from the task of seeking ‘theoretical clarity’ and 
‘winning’ arguments and towards the ‘double hermeneutical’ (Giddens 1984) idea of 
an ongoing dialogue between academic housing researchers that are pre-figuratively 
embedded in the world, rather than ‘outside’ of it, and those that are living struggles.  
In this schema, text becomes a multi-authored aspect of a dialogical ‘journey’ which is 
undertaken on ‘common ground’ rather than another site on an intellectual 
battleground.  It should serve to inspire whilst also being humble about its 
shortcomings.  
 
The paper gives examples of how such a pre-figurative academic housing research 
can be developed in practice.  It shows that many social scientists are already familiar 
with ideas of the co-production of knowledge and text, which represents welcome 
progress towards a more reconciliatory and collaborative practice.  However, it also 
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notes that knowledge co-production seems to be the limit of the mainstream social 
scientific ambition as it stands.  Moreover, it is limited:  Although the academic 
tendency is to locate the agency for housing and urban change in text, anarchists 
would point out that change is not all about text – no matter how democratically it is 
authored. It is for this reason that my paper also introduces the idea of ‘solidarity action 
research’ which presents the much more fundamental challenge about ‘living on 
common ground’ and is less familiar to Housing Researchers.  In a nutshell, it asks 
Housing Researchers to think about the context of their own lives and how they fit into 
the research they undertake.  This might sound personally intrusive but it is certainly 
consistent with feminist thinking on positionality (Harding 1991) and also Gandhi’s call 
to ‘be the change you want to see in the world’ (Vinthagen 2015).  It is also consistent 
with Castree’s (2000) Bourdieusian plea for social scientists to liberate themselves 
from their own privileges by re-embedding themselves in everyday contexts.  As the 
respondents in my Housing Market Renewal and Social Class book frequently said 
‘how can they say that about my area unless they live here?’15  
 
Although the ‘getting out and impacting’ paper (Allen 2016) has been an important 
rejoinder to my fallacy paper (Allen 2009) it represents one part of a wider programme 
of work I am now pursuing which is building a collaborative, reconciliatory and 
nonviolent approach to housing research and housing practice.  This programme of 
work is emerging out of my phenomenological critique of social science and my current 
interest in bringing hitherto different and even hostile forms of knowledge together.   
These forms of knowledge are disciplinary (e.g. a new interest in theology) as well as 
                                                          
15 This could be taken to imply that Housing Researchers are not ‘well within their rights to continue 
doing what they are doing’.  
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experiential (e.g. my longstanding interest in primary experience).  One of these 
papers in this current programme of work examines the ontological and 
epistemological contours of the ‘versus’ relationship between social science and 
theology (Allen 2017a).  This was a complex task but it enabled me to find a space in 
which social sciences might collaborate with theologians and, in doing so, produce a 
more compelling voice for social change.  Another paper is producing a 
comprehensive theoretical examination of the violence of housing policy (Allen 2017b).  
Building on my phenomenological work, this paper points to the limits of social science 
which has the epistemic tools to identify violence (albeit, I claim, randomly) but lacks 
those to map a route out of it.  To achieve this, I engage with other disciplinary 
traditions (especially theology) and literatures (such as nonviolence).   When a 
nonviolence perspective is posited in this way, housing policy debate begins to look 
very different to the way it is currently argued between critical and mainstream 
perspectives.  A collaborative and reconciliatory approach becomes a perforce 
necessity.   
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